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Abstract
We make use of micro{level data for over 45,000 private bond issues by over 5000 rms
from 22 countries in 1990-2006 to analyze the impact that the launch of the EMU had on their
currency denomination. The use of the micro data allows us to isolate the \euro eect" on
new and seasoned bond issuers while conditioning on individual issue characteristics. To our
knowledge, ours is the rst systematic analysis of this topic at the micro level. We nd that the
impact on new issuers is larger than on seasoned issuers and that most of the increase in the
euro{denominated bond issuance by seasoned borrowers was along the \extensive" margin, i.e.
borrowers switching currency denomination of their issues. Insofar as new entrants to the bond
market will dene the overall currency composition in the long run, these results imply that
aggregate studies might be underestimating the euro eect. We also nd that to a large extent
the increase in euro issuance was \at the expense" of U.S. dollar issuance, suggesting that euro
competes with the U.S. dollar as a currency of choice for international nancial transactions.
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11 Introduction
Firms issuing in international bond markets face a choice of currency issue. Issuing in domestic
currency avoids \currency mismatch" issues for rms whose revenues are biased towards their
domestic currencies. There may also be increased administrative costs associated with marketing
an issue in a foreign currency. On the other hand, foreign \vehicle currencies," such as the dollar,
are likely to have achieved substantial cost reductions through economies of scale. Increases in the
volume of transactions in a given currency raises analyst coverage, hedging opportunities, and the
set of potential customers. While currency denomination choices are made at the rm level, they
are likely to have aggregate implications. A viable domestic-currency bond market may provide
stability at the aggregate level to rms in countries facing currency devaluations, even those who
in more tranquil periods may have chosen to issue in foreign currencies.
The choice of invoice currency in international goods transactions has been studied extensively.
Early studies emphasized choosing a currency to reduce transactions costs, e.g. Swoboda (1968),
while more recent studies have stressed minimizing exposure to macroeconomic volatility [e.g.
Giovannini (1988)] and network eects [e.g. Rey (2001) and Goldberg and Tille (2008)]. These
same concerns should arise in the currency-denomination decision for bond issuance. In this paper,
we investigate the determinants of currency denomination in bond issuance by examining the impact
of the launch of the euro on world bond markets using micro{level data.
There is a large outstanding literature providing evidence of a \euro{eect" on rm nancing
decisions at the aggregate level. Galati and Tsatsaronis (2003) and Pagano and Von Thadden
(2004) nd large eects of the advent of the euro on volumes and yield spreads in European bond
markets. Similarly, Lane (2006a) and (2006b) nd evidence of a euro{area bias in international
bond portfolio movements. Spiegel (2008) nds evidence of a euro{area bias among Portuguese
and Greek commercial bank borrowers subsequent to EMU accession.
2The introduction of the euro has been shown to lead to a reduction in the cost of issuance
in euro relative to pre-monetary union national currencies [e.g. Santos and Tsatsaronis (2006)].
Coeurdacier and Martin (2006) nd that the advent of the euro has resulted in a 14% to 17%
reduction in transactions costs. Kim, Moshirian, and Wu (2006) conrm that the launch of the
EMU corresponded to a period of increased nancial market integration in European stock and
bond markets. Melnik and Nissim (2006) nd that the introduction of the euro reduced the cost of
issuing bonds in euro relative to the cost of issuing in national currencies of future EMU member
countries. Drudi (2007) demonstrates that euro area rms moved from bank to bond nancing
subsequent to the launch of the EMU.
Our data set includes all bonds issued in international bond markets by private rms with
nationality of operations in one of 22 countries active in international bond markets. Our sample
period is 1990-2006, so that we include 9 years before the EMU took eect and 8 years afterwards.
To our knowledge, our paper is the rst to bring a large micro{level data set to bear on this issue.1
The use of micro{level data allows us to condition on the currency of each bond issue, its size, its
maturity, its governing law, and the true issuer's nationality. The latter is especially important
because it allows us to distinguish between changes attributable to the advent of the monetary
union, and those attributable to issuer nationality eects and because, as Warnock and Cleaver
(2003) point out, analysis based on aggregate data is subject to a bias due to oshore bond issuance.
We rst examine the impact of the advent of the euro on rm nancing decisions in a multino-
mial logit specication. Firms choose their currency of issue between US dollars, euro, yen, British
pounds, or another currency. We separate non{nancial rms from nancial rms, as they are likely
to be less adept at hedging on average and hence more likely to be inuenced by the increased scale
economies associated with issuing in euro. We then split our sample into four regions: nancial
1Melnik and Nissim (2006) do look at a smaller sample of 316 eurobond issues, but the focus of their study is
on changes in the terms of borrowing, rather than volumes. Santos and Tsatsaronis (2006) show that the arrival of
the euro led to a reduction in the underwriting fees of corporate bonds issued in the new currency due to increased
competition.
3centers, EMU insiders, small outsiders, which are dened as all countries outside the European
Union whose currency is not one of main issuing currencies, and non-EMU EU members.
Our results conrm an economically and statistically signicant impact of the advent of the
euro on non{nancial rms, but not on nancial rms. Our point estimates indicate that, other
things being equal, the probability that a non{nancial rm bond issue was denominated in euro
was 35 percentage points higher after the advent of the EMU, while the probability that it was
denominated in U.S. dollars was 34 percentage points lower. This indicates that most of the increase
in euro{issuance was \at the expense" of U.S. dollar issuance. We nd similar impacts for issuers
from nancial centers, but the eect that is half that size for issuers from the euro area and small
outsider countries, and we nd no signicant eect for non-EMU EU countries.
Our results for \small outsider countries," are of particular interest. They speak to the de-
sirability of encouraging the formation of local currency bond markets.2 These are the types of
countries that typically pursue policies to encourage local bond market development, and the re-
sponsiveness of individual rms from these countries to the launch of the euro is an indicator of
how sensitive they are likely to be to changes in the scale of their domestic market as well.
We then isolate the overall EMU eect into three channels, two on the \extensive margin"
and one on the \intensive margin." We associate growth on the extensive margin with euro|
denominated issues by rms that were not issuing in euro previously. There are obviously two
types of such rms; unseasoned rms that are issuing in the international bond market for the rst
time, and seasoned rms that previously issued in a currency other than euro. On the \intensive
margin," seasoned rms that already issued in currencies of future EMU members may respond to
the decreased cost of issuing in euro by increasing the volume of their euro{denominated issues.
Unseasoned rms may lack incentives linking them to a specic currency market. These
may include xed costs associated with launching in a currency for the rst time, or long{term
2See, for example, Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004).
4relationships with rm underwriters or important customers in certain currency bond markets. The
literature supports the existence of such xed costs. Cai, Helwege, and Warga (2007) nd that IPO
bonds are subject to more underpricing, while Gande, Puri, and Saunders (1999) nd that IPO
bonds carry higher spreads than bonds of seasoned issuers, and Hale and Santos (2008) nd that
rms pay higher spreads on their IPO bonds than on subsequent issues.
Over time, the decisions made by unseasoned issuers are likely to drive the global pattern of
currency denomination. A substantial portion of issuers exit over time. Moreover, the forces that
tie issuers to a currency, such as informational asymmetries across markets, are likely to diminish
over time. As such, if unseasoned rms are systematically more sensitive to changes in market
volumes, such as those associated with the advent of the euro, aggregate studies of the initial
response to the launch of the EMU are likely to underestimate the magnitude of the longer run
impact of the EMU.
To investigate this channel, we restrict our sample to unseasoned issuers. We again nd a
signicant positive impact, of about the same magnitude as for the full sample, of the launch of
the euro on the probability of issuing in euro.
We then examine the impact of the euro on the probability of switching to euro{denominated
bonds. We limit our sample to the set of issues by seasoned rms that issued both before and
after the launch of the EMU. We nd that the probability that a non{nancial rm issuing in euro
or the national currency of a future EMU country will continue to issue in euro increases by 14
percentage points after the launch of EMU. However, we do not nd a signicant impact of the
EMU launch on the probability that a non{nancial rm issuing in another currency would move
into euro. This implies that seasoned rms were just as likely to switch from other currencies to
euro after the EMU, but once they did switch, they were much more likely to stay with the euro
after the launch of the EMU.
To thoroughly isolate the components of the overall increase in euro{denominated issues, we
5next compare changes in volumes issued in euro and other currencies by new and seasoned rms. We
nd a positive, but insignicant impact of the launch of the euro on the volume of euro{denominated
issues by rms that issued both in future euro{area national currencies prior to the launch of
the EMU and in euro afterwards. In contrast, we nd a positive statistically and economically
signicant impact among all seasoned rms. As such, our results provide weak evidence that the
euro eect among seasoned rm was stronger among those that had previously not issued in euro.
We also nd that the impact of the EMU on unseasoned issuers was higher than for the full sample.
This would be expected as unseasoned issuers would be more inclined to respond to the enhanced
scale opportunities presented by the launch of the euro if there are xed costs of issuing in a
currency for the rst time, as in Hale and Santos (2008).
Overall, then, our results suggest that the bulk of the euro eect was attributable to increases
in euro{denominated issues on the extensive margin, among rms that either were issuing for the
rst time or that had previously issued in a non-euro-area currency, with the strongest impact for
unseasoned rms. Indeed, in our sample the volume of euro{denominated issues by unseasoned
rms after the launch of the EMU amounted to almost 81% of total euro{denominated issuance,
while before the EMU the corresponding share was less than 52%.
The remainder of this paper is divided four sections. Section 2 lays out in detail our empirical
approach. Section 3 describes our data sources and characterizes the sample. Section 4 presents
our empirical results. Section 5 concludes with nal remarks.
2 Empirical approach
Not all countries have rms that borrow internationally. Therefore, we only observe foreign (and
foreign currency) bond issues for a relatively small subset of countries. If the same set of variables
explain whether or not borrowers in a country borrowed internationally and whether or not they
6choose a certain currency denomination of their bond, there is a possibility of selection bias. To
address this issue, we estimate a selection equation concerning the determinants of issuing interna-
tionally. Our selection equation is a probit regression for as many countries as we can get data for
with the dependent variable being an indicator of whether private rms operating in a particular
country issued an international bond in a given year. We use as explanatory variables the variables
that are found to aect international capital ows.3 From this regression we construct an inverse
mills ratio imr, which we include as a regressor among other country{specic time{varying control
variables, in our currency denomination regressions.
Our goal is both to measure the size of the eect of EMU on currency denomination of inter-
national bonds and to estimate the relative importance of the three margins along which this eect
could potentially work: rms entering the international bond market for the rst time choosing
to issue in euro, rms already in the international bond market changing their issue currency in
favor of euro, and rms issuing in multiple currencies altering their currency shares in their overall
portfolio in favor of the euro. We begin by analyzing the currency composition of bond issues in
the full sample of bonds by estimating a multinomial logit system of equations as follows
I(CURifct = k) = k








where k is one of the currencies: U.S. Dollar, a euro area currency (to which we would refer to
euro even in the period before the EMU), Japanese Yen, or British Pound. All other currencies
are grouped into the category \Other" and represent the base category. CURifct is a currency in
which bond i issued by a rm f from country c in year t is denominated. c are country xed
eects, Xi is a set of bond{specic control variables, Yt is a set of global variables that only vary
over time, Zct is a set of country{specic time{varying control variables.
Our coecients of interest are the k's, which measure how the probability of issuing a bond
3The results of this regression are reported in the Appendix Table A.1.
7in each of the four currencies k versus any other currency has changed after the EMU took eect.
Thus, the multinomial logit approach will allow us not only to see whether the probability of issuing
in euro increased after the launch of the EMU but also at what other currency's \expense" this
change might have occurred.
Next, we identify three margins along which the EMU eect could take place: (a) rms entering
the international bond market for the rst time might be more likely to choose euro as a currency
of their bond issue; (b) seasoned rms that issued in other currencies might be more likely to
switch to euro in their subsequent issues after the EMU; and (c) rms that have issued in euro area
currencies before the EMU may increase the amount they borrow in euro versus the amount they
borrow in another currency.
We rst estimate the same model as represented by equation (1), but limit our sample to the
rst international bond issued by a given borrower. As we described above, the idea here is to
isolate the eects of the EMU on new entrants to the international bond market that are not yet
bound with ties to a specic underwriter or market.
Second, we focus on seasoned borrowers that issued at least one international bond before the
EMU took eect and at least one international bond after the EMU took eect. This sample allows
us to investigate whether the probability of switching to euro{denominated bonds has changed after
the launch of the EMU. As above, we estimate a multinomial logit regression, but this time there
are four possible outcomes for each issue: a switch from non{euro denomination to euro, a switch
from euro to non{euro, both current and previous issues in euro, and both current and previous
issues in non{euro. The last case serves as a base category in the specication
I(CURifct = k;CURi 1fct = j) = kj












where j represents the currency in which the previous bond issued by rm f was denominated,
8euro or non{euro, and k is dened as before, except all non{euro currencies are now lumped into
one category. All other variables are dened as above and only rms that issued before and after
the EMU are included in order for the results not to be driven by rms that either exit the sample
before the EMU or enter the sample after the EMU took eect. As before, we are interested in the
kj coecients that indicate the probability changes associated with the launch of the EMU.
As a nal test, we aggregate our data at a country{year level. This allows us to consider
borrowing volumes in addition to the frequency of issues in any given currency. To continue
focusing on the three possible margins along which the euro eect could have taken place, we
construct four sets of aggregates: (a) total borrowing in euro and in all currencies combined by
rms in each country{year, (b) amount borrowed through rst international bond issues (rst for
each rm) in each country{year in euro and in all currencies combined, (c) amount borrowed in
euro and in all currencies combined by rms that issued in international bond market both before
and after EMU took eect, and (d) amount borrowed in euro and in all currencies combined by
rms that issued in euro in the international bond market both before and after EMU took eect.
Using these aggregates, we calculate the share of euro{denominated bonds in the total amount
borrowed in each country{year for each of the four sets of rms. With these shares (SH) as our
dependent variables we estimate four linear regressions with country xed eects.
SHct = c +  I(t > 1999) + Y0
t2 + Z0
ct3 + "ct: (3)
As discussed below, comparisons of these four linear regressions allows us to estimate the
relative importance of each of these three channels in terms of volumes as well as numbers of issues
for the three euro eect channels we consider.
93 Data and Sample Description
An important advantage of our analysis is the use of micro{level data. Our bond data is made
up of a list of bond issues and provide ample information on bond issue characteristics and some
information on the issuer. The information on the issuer allows us to identify the true nationality
of the issuer, whether the issuer's main operation is in the nancial industry, and allows us to
keep track of bonds issued by the same rm. However, as we do not have rm balance sheet
information, our ability to condition on rm characteristics is limited to these indicators, and our
primary conditioning is on the characteristics of the issue.
We also supplement our bond data with country{level macroeconomic data and with LIBOR
interest rates for main currencies.
3.1 Bond data
We use all bonds issued in international bond markets by private rms with nationality of operations
in one of 22 countries. The data span 1980 through February 2007. However, because there are only
a few international bonds issued during the 1980-1985 period, and because we want to balance the
number of years before and after the EMU, we limit the sample period in our analysis to 1990-2006.
This information comes from DCM Analytics, which is available from Dealogic. Thus, we have 9
years of data before the EMU took eect and 8 years of data afterwards.4
We identify the nationality of the issuer by its nationality of operations. The nationality of
operations is likely to best match the currency in which the bond issuer's expenses are invoiced.
Table A.2 presents the count and the volume (in US dollars) of bonds issued during our sample
period by all countries in our sample, which we separate into four groups: EMU members (\insid-
ers"), non{EMU nancial centers (\nancial centers"), less inuential countries outside EU (\small
4We keep 1990 in the sample because in some regressions we use lagged variables.
10outsiders"), and EU members who did not join the EMU (\non{EMU EU"). We make two impor-
tant observations with respect to this Table. First, both the number and the U.S. dollar volume
of bond issues increased dramatically from the period before EMU to the period after. Second, in
both periods the total amount borrowed by euro area issuers is about half of that issued by rms
located in nancial centers, while the number of bonds is more comparable, which implies that an
average issue by a euro area rm is smaller than that of the nancial center rm.
We identify the market on which the bond is issued by the currency denomination of the bond.
While there are other ways to segment the international bond market (for example, by governing
law), we believe that dening the market as all bonds issued in a given currency is most relevant
for our particular experiment. Table A.3 presents bond characteristics (issue size and maturity)
by currency denomination of a bond issue before and after EMU for the full sample and for small
outsiders. The following observations are worth pointing out: (a) while the average issue size
denominated in U.S. dollars or other (non{euro) currency about doubled in the period after EMU
compared to the period before, the average issue size denominated in a euro area currency tripled;
(b) the average maturity of U.S. dollar denominated bonds remained the same, while the maturity
of other currency bonds lengthened; (c) the average size of a bond issue is larger if it is denominated
in dollars than if it is denominated in a currency of the euro area, which in turn is larger than the
average size of a bond issue denominated in another currency, although these dierences are not
statistically signicant; (d) dierences in maturity across currency denomination of bonds are not
large and are not statistically signicant.
Our sample includes nancial rms as well as non{nancial rms. Because we believe that
nancial and non{nancial rms face dierent currency risk structures and have dierent choices
when issuing an international bond, we conduct all our analysis separately for nancial and non{
nancial rms. Figure 1 shows the shares of the volume of bond issues in each market before and
after EMU by the borrowers from all 22 countries in our sample, for non{nancial and nancial
11rms separately. We can see that the share of non-nancial rms denominated in euro area cur-
rencies increased dramatically from the period before EMU to the period after. This observation
is consistent with ndings of previous studies (e.g. Lane (2006a,b)).5 Notably, we can see almost
no increase in the share of issues denominated in euro area currencies by nancial rms.
Figures 2-5 show the shares of the volume of bond issues in each market before and after the
launch of the EMU by the borrowers from our four dierent regions: nancial centers, EMU insiders,
small outsiders, and non{EMU EU.6 We can see that for non{nancial borrowers from all of these
regions, the share of bond issues denominated in euro area currencies increased dramatically after
the launch of the EMU, and that this increase was at the expense of the dollar{denominated issues.
For nancial rms, we only see a substantial increase in the share of euro area denominated issues
for issuers from the EU (whether EMU members or not). Possibly, this dierence can be due to
the enhancements to European payments, in particular the new TARGET payment system, that
aected all EU member countries and was launched at roughly the same time that the euro was
introduced.
3.2 Other data
The rest of our data sources are conventional. In order to conduct our rst stage estimation, we
rst created an annual panel data set containing the following variables: GDP in U.S. dollars,
current account scaled by GDP, capital account openness, country credit ratings, annual coecient
of variation of exports, nominal interest rate, 1-year US treasury rate, and exchange rate regime.
National accounts data come from the IMF's World Economic Outlook Online Database, April
2008 edition. The capital controls variable, an index in which a higher value indicates a country is
5Given the overall increase in bond issuance discussed above, it is important to keep in mind that while the share
of U.S. dollar denominated issues declined, the total amount issued in U.S. dollar has still increased substantially.
6Appendix Table A.2. lists countries in each region. In particular, because the United Kingdom is a nancial
center, our non{EMU region is comprised by Denmark and Sweden.
12more open to cross{border capital transactions, comes from Chinn and Ito (2006). Country credit
ratings are compiled from the Institutional Investor magazine's annual September ratings. Data
for nominal interest rates come from the IMF's International Financial Statistics, with lending
rates replaced with deposit rates for countries for which deposit rates are missing. The 1-year
US treasury rate data was obtained from FAME, a Federal Reserve Board database, LIBOR rates
are from Bloomberg. Finally, exchange rate regime data come from Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogo
(2008); we use their \coarse" classication codes. We use some of these variables as controls in our
second stage regressions as well.
4 Empirical results
We rst conrm that our nding of an overall increase in euro{denominated bond issuance after the
EMU, discussed above, is true in a parametric setting. Table 1 presents the marginal eects of the
\After EMU" indicator from our multinomial logit regression for the full sample of bond issues, as
well as split by region and separately for nancial and non{nancial issuers.7 In this specication
each rm chooses one of the ve currencies for each of its bond issues: dollar, euro, yen, pound, or
any other currency. We choose \other currency" as our base category. We nd that, for the full
sample of non{nancial rms, there is a strongly signicant 35.3 percentage point increase in the
probability of denominating its bonds in euro and a similar decrease (34.1 percentage points) in
the probability of denominating in dollars after the EMU.
The eects are similar if we limit our sample to rms from nancial centers, and are about
half the size for EMU insiders and small outsiders. For non{EMU EU rms (rms from Denmark
and Sweden in our sample), although we observe an increase in the probability of issuing in euro
after the EMU, it is not statistically signicant, possibly due to a small number of observations.
In all cases, except this last group, the increase in the probability to choose euro as the currency
7All multinomial regressions are fully reported in the Appendix.
13of the bond issue comes at the expense of the dollar, while probability of choosing yen, pound, or
other currencies does not appear to be aected by the launch of the euro.
For nancial rms, on the other hand, we do not nd a statistically signicant euro eect,
except in case of the non{EMU EU region. In fact, for rms from nancial centers and small
outsider countries, there is a small decline in the probability of denominating in euro after the
launch of the EMU. In addition, we see a small increase in the probability of denominating bond
issues in pounds for nancial rms from the euro area. This particular eect maybe pointing at the
potential for an increased importance of London as a nancial center after the launch of the euro
and the launch of the TARGET payment system, issues that are beyond the scope of the current
paper.
4.1 Extensive margins
We now turn to the three channels of response to the launch of the euro discussed above. Since
we do not observe much increase in the euro issuance after the EMU by nancial rms, we limit
our analysis of the euro eect channels to non{nancial rms. The channels we consider include
two extensive margins | an increase in the choice of the euro for currency denomination of rst
international bond issues by rms that are issuing in international markets for the rst time, and
changes in international bond issue currency denomination in favor of the euro by seasoned issuers.
The intensive margin channel is an increase in the share of euro area currency issues in total
international bond issuance by borrowers that issue in multiple currencies.
The results of adjustments along the extensive margins are reported in Table 2. The rst
channel focuses on the eect the launch of the EMU had on rms that issue in the international
bond market for the rst time.8 Our hypothesis is that these rms will be more sensitive to the
8Our data set does not have complete coverage of the domestic bond market, so we do not know whether rms
previously issued in that market. Nevertheless, there are additional costs of entering the international bond market,
even for rms that are seasoned in their local bond markets. As such, being seasoned or unseasoned in the international
14savings that the emergence of a new deep market potentially presents, because, unlike seasoned
borrowers, they are not tied to any specic market.
The top panel of Table 2 presents the marginal eects of the same multinomial regressions as
the ones reported in Table 1, except this time we limit our sample to the rst international bond
issue for each rm. We can see the eects that are very similar to the full sample | after the EMU
the probability of issuing in euro area currencies increased by 33.6 percent while the probability of
denominating the bond in U.S. dollar fell by 33.2 percent.
The second extensive{margin response to the launch of the EMU, namely the switching of
seasoned borrowers from issuing in other currencies to issuing in euro is analyzed in the bottom
panel of Table 2. For this analysis, we limit our sample to rms that issued international bonds both
before and after the launch of the EMU (Firms BA) in order for the results not to be aected by
the changing sample of rms over time. We construct a new indicator, that measures the transition
from and to euro area currencies, this time combining all the non{euro currencies into one category
\non{euro." We again use a multinomial specication, but this time the outcomes are dened
as: (0 | base category) issuing in currency other than euro given that previous bond was also in
currency other than euro; (1) issuing in euro (or currency of future EMU member) given that the
previous issue was also in euro (or currency of future EMU member); (2) issuing in euro given that
the previous issue was in currency other than euro; and (3) issuing in currency other than euro
given that the previous issue was in euro.
Our results indicate that while there was an increase in inows from non{euro to euro area
currencies after the EMU, it was small and not statistically signicant. In fact, the outow from
euro into non{euro currencies increased slightly more, and this eect is signicant. More impor-
tantly, however, we observe a large, 14 percentage point increase in the probability of continuing to
denominate in euro from one issue to the next after the launch of the EMU, while the probability
bond market would likely inuence the choice of currency denomination in the following issue.
15of staying in a non{euro category fell by 21 percentage points. This implies there is an increase in
transition into euro over the long run after the launch of the EMU.
4.2 Intensive margin and comparisons
We now turn to the intensive margin, namely the change in the share of funds raised on the euro{
denominated bond market in total bond issuance by rms that were already issuing in currencies of
future EMU members before the launch of the EMU and remained active in the euro{denominated
market afterwards (Firms EuroBA). By denition of this sub{sample, these are the rms that were
already borrowing in currencies of future EMU members before the EMU took eect.
Table 4 summarizes the data for non{nancial rms and shows that while the share of euro
in total issuance increased after the launch of the EMU for the full sample, the share for rms
that were active on the euro{denominated market both before and after the launch of the EMU
remained unchanged. This is in particular contrast with the change in the currency composition of
new issues, for which share of euro increased from 9.4% to 46.3%.
Because this analysis is not possible at the rm level, we aggregate the total amount borrowed
by each specic group of rms in euro and in other currencies for each country{year and compute
the share of euro{denominated issuance in each country in each year for each group of rms. In
addition to the full sample of bonds issued by non{nancial rms, we consider rst bond issues,
bond issues by rms that borrowed both before and after the EMU, and bond issues by rms that
borrowed in euro area currencies both before and after the EMU. Clearly the fourth group is the
subset of the third.
Table 5 presents full results of linear regression with country xed eects for the country{year
panel. Once again, we conrm that in the full sample of non{nancial rms there is an increase
in the share of euro{denominated bonds (rst column) after the launch of the EMU. This share
increased by 18.3 percentage points after the launch of the EMU. We also see, once again, a similar
16and in fact a slightly larger impact of the launch of EMU for the sub{sample of rst issues (second
column). We do not, however, nd a signicant eect of the EMU along the intensive margin
(last column) | the coecient on the \After EMU" indicator, while positive, is not statistically
signicant in the sub{sample of rms that were active on the euro{denominated bond market both
before and after the launch of the EMU (Firms EuroBA). Keeping in mind that these rms also
enter in the subset of rms that were active on overall international bond market both before and
after the EMU launch (Firms BA, third column), we can see that the second extensive margin
discussed above, namely the switching of the rms from other currencies into euro, is what is
driving the signicant, and larger, coecient in the third column.
We conclude from this analysis that changes along the two extensive margins discussed above
played a much larger role than those along the intensive margin in driving the observed move
towards the euro in international bond currency denominations subsequent to the launch of the
EMU. Within that category, we nd that the eect was the strongest for the rst extensive margin,
i.e. among the new entrants to the international bond market.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we used micro{level data to analyze the impact that the launch of the EMU had on
the currency denomination of international bond issues. While the increase in bond issuance in
the currencies of the euro area after the EMU has been documented at the aggregate level, to our
knowledge, ours is the rst systematic analysis of this issue at the micro level.
Micro{level analysis allowed us to study separately nancial and non{nancial rms and to
determine the relative importance of the channels through which this increase took place. We nd
that the bulk of the increase occurred among non{nancial rms, and do not event nd a signicant
"euro eect" among nancial rms. This result suggests that nancial rms, which are quite adept
17at hedging currency risk and conducting international transactions, were closer to their optimal
exposure to euro area currencies prior to the launch of the EMU, so they did not increase that
exposure markedly after the launch of the monetary union.
In contrast, we nd a substantial statistically signicant euro eect for our sample of non{
nancial rms. We then examine the channels through which this increase in euro denomination
by non{nancial rms took place. We nd that the increase in the issuance of euro{denominated
bonds by non{nancial rms was mainly driven by a large increase in the propensity of new entrants
to international bond market to denominate their rst bond issue in euro and by the increase in
the number of rms that continued issuing in euro once they entered that market. We do not nd
signicant evidence of an increase along the \intensive margin," i.e. in the increase in share of euro
issuance by rms that were already active issuers in the currencies of future EMU members before
the launch of the EMU.
Using multinomial logit specication, we also nd that most of the increase in euro issuance
was at the expense of dollar issuance. Taken together, these ndings suggest that we might expect
the launch of the euro to accelerate the decline in the share of dollar{denomina7ted issues in inter-
national bond markets: First, the bulk of the increase in euro{denominated bond issues occurred at
the extensive margin, and we would expect the decisions made by rms at the extensive margin to
become more representative going forward, as characteristics tieing rms to individual currencies
are likely to weaken over time. Second, we found that the increase in euro{denominated issues
came largely at the expense of the dollar.
It therefore appears that on average rms that are issuing in dollars are less tied to that
currency than are rms issuing in other currencies, such as yen or pounds. This would be intuitive,
since the dominant position of the dollar would likely leave it the currency denomination of choice
for rms that had little preference over currency denominations. However, as the market for
bonds denominated in euro continues to grow, these more footloose rms will be the most likely
18to respond to the increased liquidity in euro{denominated bond markets by switching to issuing in
that currency. Since these rms are most likely to be initially issuing in dollars, these increases are
likely to come at the expense of the share of dollar{denominated issues, and may portend further
declines in the share of dollar-denominated issues in this market.
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21Figure 1: Currency denomination of international bond issues. All issuers.
Before EMU, non−financial Before EMU, financial
After EMU, non−financial After EMU, financial
USD Euro Yen Pound Other
Note: pie charts constructed by amount issued.
22Figure 2: Currency denomination of international bond issues. Financial centers.
Before EMU, non−financial Before EMU, financial
After EMU, non−financial After EMU, financial
USD Euro Yen Pound Other
Note: pie charts constructed by amount issued.
23Figure 3: Currency denomination of international bond issues. Euro zone issuers.
Before EMU, non−financial Before EMU, financial
After EMU, non−financial After EMU, financial
USD Euro Yen Pound Other
Note: pie charts constructed by amount issued.
24Figure 4: Currency denomination of international bond issues. Small outsiders.
Before EMU, non−financial Before EMU, financial
After EMU, non−financial After EMU, financial
USD Euro Yen Pound Other
Note: pie charts constructed by amount issued.
25Figure 5: Currency denomination of international bond issues. Denmark and Sweden.
Before EMU, non−financial Before EMU, financial
After EMU, non−financial After EMU, financial
USD Euro Yen Pound Other
Note: pie charts constructed by amount issued.
26Table 1: Overall eect of the EMU by region of issuer
Currency: USD Euro Yen Pound Other cur.
Non{nancial rms
All regions -34.1*** 35.3*** 0.031 -1.13 -0.085
(3.71) (2.06) (0.30) (3.03) (0.29)
Fin. centers -30.3*** 31.5*** 0.065 -1.33 0.028
(9.63) (2.61) (0.23) (11.2) (0.064)
EMU insiders -15.5** 15.9** -0.079 -0.034 -0.28
(6.55) (6.20) (0.13) (0.61) (0.27)
Small outsiders -18.6 13.3*** 0.00017 -0.84 6.10
(11.5) (4.27) (0.0021) (1.06) (10.3)
Denmark & Sweden 0.071 3.51 -0.0034 . -3.58
(0.049) (3.96) (0.0024) . (3.91)
Financial rms
All regions 1.74 -3.39 -0.99 1.92 0.70
(2.67) (2.46) (1.11) (1.60) (1.35)
Fin. centers 0.51 -3.91*** 0.39 2.89 0.12
(6.08) (1.40) (1.00) (3.08) (0.70)
EMU insiders 0.90 1.36 -1.94** 2.85* -3.17
(4.49) (6.54) (0.84) (1.58) (2.14)
Small outsiders -1.68 -7.66*** 4.20 -1.09 6.23
(12.4) (1.59) (4.33) (1.22) (9.58)
Denmark & Sweden 0.93 30.3** -23.1 -0.25 -7.88
(3.63) (13.6) (29.4) (0.16) (46.7)
Note: Reported are marginal eects of \After EMU" indicator in multinomial logit regressions (percentage
points). Dependent variable is currency of bond issue, base category is \other currency." Full regressions are
reported in Appendix tables. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Marginal eects and their standard errors
are multiplied by 100 to be represented in percentage points. They might not add up to 0 across outcomes
due to rounding. Signicance levels are based on z-statistic's P-value: * is signicant at 10%, ** | at 5%,
*** | at 1%.
27Table 2: Extensive margins
Margin 1: currency denomination of the rst international bond
Dependent variable is currency of bond issue, base category is \other currency"
USD Euro Yen Pound Other cur.
Non{n. rms -33.2*** 33.6*** 0.0026 -0.034 -0.36
(7.84) (7.99) (0.0028) (0.044) (0.29)
Margin 2: change in currency denomination of international bonds of seasoned issuers
Dependent variable is transition to or from euro, base category is transition from non-euro to non-euro
Non-euro to Non-euro Euro to Euro Non-euro to euro Euro to noneuro
Non{n. rms -21.1*** 14.2*** 2.63 4.20***
(6.15) (2.76) (2.94) (1.56)
Note: Reported are marginal eects of \After EMU" indicator in multinomial logit regressions (percentage
points). Full regressions are reported in Appendix tables. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Marginal
eects and their standard errors are multiplied by 100 to be represented in percentage points. They might
not add up to 0 across outcomes due to rounding. Signicance levels are based on z-statistic's P-value: * is
signicant at 10%, ** | at 5%, *** | at 1%.
28Table 3: Amount issued (bil. USD) by non{nancial rms
Before EMU After EMU
in Euro Total Share Euro/Total in Euro Total Share Euro/Total
All issues 114.7 964.6 11.9% 4186.8 9134.2 45.8%
First issues 59.1 627.0 9.4% 3383.4 7309.5 46.3%
Firms BAa 39.4 234.7 16.8% 513.5 1128.0 45.5%
Firms EuroBAb 33.9 66.8 50.7% 415.7 818.0 50.8%
Other BAc 5.5 167.9 3.3% 97.8 310.0 31.5%
a Firms BA: rms that issued bonds both before and after EMU.
b Firms EuroBA: rms that issued bonds in a currency of the euro area both before and after EMU.
c Other BA: rms that issued bonds both before and after EMU but are not in Firms EuroBA set.
29Table 4: The eect of EMU on the share of euro{denominated issues (by amount)
All rms First issues Firms BAa Firms EuroBAb
After EMU 0.183*** 0.189*** 0.157** 0.114
(0.050) (0.059) (0.068) (0.117)
USD int. rate 0.005 0.043* -0.018 -0.021
(0.018) (0.024) (0.024) (0.047)
DM-USD int. rate -0.051** -0.094*** -0.031 -0.024
(0.021) (0.029) (0.029) (0.055)
JY-USD int. rate 0.042 0.095** 0.020 0.000
(0.027) (0.036) (0.039) (0.070)
BP-USD int. rate 0.030 0.035 0.026 0.073
(0.023) (0.028) (0.032) (0.051)
Ination -0.043** -0.035 -0.004 -0.139***
(0.017) (0.027) (0.026) (0.048)
II rating 1.420** 3.525*** 1.908* 1.085
(0.546) (0.822) (1.078) (1.991)
ER volatility -0.000 -0.001 -0.025 0.051
(0.004) (0.021) (0.035) (0.057)
I(Fixed ER) 0.089 0.596*** -0.197* -0.254*
(0.097) (0.105) (0.111) (0.144)
Selection 0.724 -57.162*** 25.226*** 12.514
(2.269) (12.461) (6.465) (8.945)
Observations 146 65 87 53
Countries 18 13 14 12
R2 0.460 0.783 0.434 0.421
a Firms BA: rms that issued bonds both before and after EMU.
b Firms EuroBA: rms that issued bonds in a currency of the euro area both before and after EMU.
Note: Dependant variable is the share of issues (by amount) denominated in a currency of the euro area,
aggregated across a sample of rms, as indicated, at country-year level.
Fixed eects regression. Non-nancial rms only. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
30A Appendix
Table A.1: 1st stage results
Coecient Std. error
GDP (in U.S. dollars) 0.006*** 0.001
CA/GDP -0.009** 0.004
Financial account openness 0.075*** 0.028
II credit rating 0.043*** 0.003
Coef. of variation of exports -14.877*** 5.539
Interest rate -0.0003** 0.0001
1-year U.S. Treasure rate -0.028 0.034
ER regime: hard or crawling peg 0.109 0.471
ER regime: crawling peg -0.204** 0.092
ER regime: crawling peg or band -0.345 0.480
ER regime: crawling band -0.004 0.110
ER regime: free oat 0.169 0.197
ER regime: free fall -0.061 0.162
ER regime: dual market 0.052 0.340
Pseudo-R2: 0.57; Num. obs.: 2361; Num. countries: 139; Log Likelihood: -695.6
Probit regression. Panel of country{year observations.
Dependent variable: I(Number of foreign bond issues > 0.
Exchange rate regime: hard peg is an omitted category.
Year xed eects for 1981-2006 omitted.
31Table A.2: Bond issues by country of issuer
Number of issues Volume of issues (bil. USD)
Before EMU After EMU Total Before EMU After EMU Total
EMU 5655 16339 21994 837.6 5557.0 6394.5
Austria 139 653 792 14.8 89.7 104.6
Belgium 380 684 1064 21.9 150.1 172.1
Finland 157 34 191 17.8 10.0 27.8
France 1282 3952 5234 200.2 1089.0 1289.2
Germany 1770 4860 6630 337.7 1764.8 2102.4
Greece 12 221 233 1.3 74.3 75.6
Ireland 112 1259 1371 16.8 283.8 300.6
Italy 191 1156 1347 31.3 587.5 618.8
Luxembourg 634 1126 1760 31.9 62.4 94.3
Netherlands 814 1417 2231 132.6 735.1 867.7
Spain 164 977 1141 31.3 710.3 741.5
Financial Centers 4880 11931 16811 1380.2 11000.7 12380.8
Japan 1068 676 1744 93.9 121.1 214.9
Switzerland 216 294 510 63.0 96.5 159.4
UK 1393 5163 6556 316.3 4989.0 5305.4
US 2203 5798 8001 907.0 5794.1 6701.1
Small Outsiders 861 4491 5352 124 566.9 691
Australia 331 1920 2251 36.9 262.8 299.8
Canada 359 753 1112 67.2 207.9 275.1
New Zealand 22 92 114 2.0 18.5 20.5
Norway 149 1726 1875 17.9 77.7 95.6
non-EMU EU 303 734 1037 20.7 95.4 116.1
Denmark 197 397 594 13.5 75.7 89.2
Sweden 106 337 443 7.2 19.7 26.9
Total 11699 33495 45194 2362.5 17220.0 19582.5
32Table A.3: Average bond characteristics (size, maturity)
Before EMU After EMU
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
All currencies
issue size (bil. USD)
All issuers 0.20 0.42 0.51 1.27
Small outsiders 0.14 0.17 0.13 0.39
maturity (yrs.)
All issuers 7.29 6.58 10.13 11.34
Small outsiders 6.90 6.16 12.88 11.57
Euro denominated
issue size (bil. USD)
All issuers 0.16 0.22 0.58 1.18
Small outsiders 0.14 0.10 0.38 0.49
maturity (yrs.)
All issuers 6.87 4.66 10.24 13.12
Small outsiders 5.85 3.35 9.58 17.75
USD denominated
issue size (bil. USD)
All issuers 0.39 0.70 0.82 1.72
Small outsiders 0.22 0.21 0.16 0.34
maturity (yrs.)
All issuers 8.57 8.14 8.32 8.74
Small outsiders 9.39 8.28 8.94 6.89
Denominated in
other currency
issue size (bil. USD)
All issuers 0.11 0.21 0.23 0.86
Small outsiders 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.38
maturity (yrs.)
All issuers 6.76 6.59 11.35 10.97
Small outsiders 5.46 4.06 15.08 11.81
33Table A.4: Multinomial logit regression for non{nancial rms. Full sample.
USD Euro Yen Pound
I(after EMU) -0.825** 0.787*** 0.131 -0.110
(0.324) (0.294) (0.578) (0.616)
Issue amount 2.395*** 2.228** -0.182 2.129**
(0.868) (0.885) (1.395) (0.892)
I(bond rating 2.491** 3.178*** -27.037*** 3.141***
is below IG) (1.108) (1.126) (1.167) (1.118)
Issue maturity 0.079*** 0.084*** 0.009 0.093***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.028) (0.026)
Euro Area issue 2.207*** 5.041*** 1.647* 3.253***
(0.618) (0.605) (0.958) (1.022)
U.S.gov. law 3.599*** 1.814*** 0.947 2.477***
(0.392) (0.303) (0.787) (0.654)
U.K.gov. law 2.936*** 2.929*** 2.561*** 4.628***
(0.458) (0.381) (0.646) (0.590)
Germany gov. law 0.153 -1.209 -0.128 0.028
(0.491) (0.800) (1.135) (0.980)
USD int. rate -0.401*** -0.324*** -0.488** -0.486***
(0.099) (0.115) (0.203) (0.125)
DM-USD int. rate -0.120 -0.290*** 0.068 -0.207*
(0.075) (0.074) (0.138) (0.123)
JY-USD int. rate -0.187 0.003 -0.600* -0.086
(0.132) (0.146) (0.333) (0.209)
BP-USD int. rate -0.163 -0.034 -0.029 -0.240*
(0.106) (0.122) (0.124) (0.141)
Selection 9.635*** 3.389 2.029 -35.710***
(2.449) (2.641) (2.830) (5.796)
CPI Ination 0.056 0.267*** 0.275** 0.234**
(0.091) (0.076) (0.132) (0.111)
II rating -9.258*** -1.476 -18.395*** -13.658***
(3.498) (4.561) (3.452) (3.558)
ER volatility 0.024** -0.007 -0.007 0.004
(0.012) (0.013) (0.019) (0.010)
I(Fixed ER) 0.707*** 0.045 0.458 2.080***
(0.258) (0.209) (0.394) (0.588)
Pseudo-R2: 0.419; Num. obs.: 11635; Log Likelihood: -9569.4
Base category is other currency.
34Table A.5: Multinomial logit regression for nancial rms. Full sample.
USD Euro Yen Pound
I(after EMU) -0.008 -0.141 -0.252 0.238
(0.139) (0.162) (0.226) (0.260)
Issue amount 2.940** 2.954** -2.053 2.449**
(1.204) (1.195) (2.604) (1.147)
I(bond rating 0.407 1.904* -2.697 -0.398
is below IG) (0.559) (1.140) (2.367) (0.772)
Issue maturity 0.110*** 0.101*** 0.232*** 0.131***
(0.024) (0.017) (0.034) (0.017)
Euro Area issue 1.701*** 2.750*** -0.294 2.853***
(0.611) (0.475) (0.638) (0.768)
U.S.gov. law 2.383*** 0.904 0.648 2.453***
(0.632) (0.774) (0.425) (0.816)
U.K.gov. law 1.842*** 1.706*** 1.352*** 2.925***
(0.471) (0.494) (0.418) (0.820)
Germany gov. law -0.395 -0.355 0.857 -1.205***
(0.432) (0.335) (0.570) (0.371)
USD int. rate -0.129 0.132** -0.561*** 0.110
(0.105) (0.053) (0.077) (0.106)
DM-USD int. rate -0.171 -0.103* 0.301*** 0.034
(0.110) (0.062) (0.095) (0.116)
JY-USD int. rate -0.096 0.007 -0.906*** -0.151*
(0.102) (0.090) (0.154) (0.091)
BP-USD int. rate 0.205* 0.164*** -0.046 0.183***
(0.104) (0.045) (0.094) (0.054)
Selection 3.641 2.124 -2.669 7.767**
(3.757) (3.397) (6.090) (3.767)
CPI Ination 0.146 -0.086 -0.002 -0.105
(0.094) (0.071) (0.059) (0.098)
II rating 0.935 2.331 -13.868*** 2.208
(3.971) (3.611) (3.545) (3.997)
ER volatility 0.008 0.005 -0.048*** -0.011***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003)
I(Fixed ER) 0.596*** 1.166*** -0.107 0.535**
(0.160) (0.161) (0.221) (0.243)
Pseudo-R2: 0.262; Num. obs.: 31486; Log Likelihood: -34783.7
Base category is other currency.
35Table A.6: Multinomial logit regression for non{nancial rms. Financial centers.
USD Euro Yen Pound
I(after EMU) -1.041*** 0.652 -0.192 -0.401
(0.380) (0.473) (0.754) (0.639)
Issue amount 3.083 2.879 -0.068 2.794
(1.899) (1.915) (2.657) (1.949)
I(bond rating 20.778*** 21.629*** -24.898 21.656
is below IG) (0.117) (0.127) (0.000) .
Issue maturity 0.169*** 0.167*** 0.089 0.182***
(0.036) (0.046) (0.069) (0.057)
Euro Area issue 2.135** 26.398*** 21.770*** 24.748***
(1.012) (2.007) (0.091) (3.241)
U.S.gov. law 4.037*** 2.242*** 1.723 3.397***
(0.455) (0.474) (1.185) (0.723)
U.K.gov. law 3.696*** 3.624*** 3.479*** 5.841***
(0.834) (0.715) (0.918) (1.003)
Germany gov. law 0.409 -22.285*** -21.069 -20.845***
. (1.444) (0.000) (2.807)
USD int. rate -0.439*** -0.357*** -0.539** -0.581***
(0.042) (0.088) (0.244) (0.073)
DM-USD int. rate -0.057 -0.167*** 0.040 -0.114
(0.123) (0.021) (0.175) (0.191)
JY-USD int. rate -0.112 -0.047 -0.366 -0.039
(0.144) (0.051) (0.384) (0.293)
BP-USD int. rate -0.418*** -0.213** -0.283** -0.535***
(0.082) (0.103) (0.113) (0.105)
CPI Ination 0.001 0.266* 0.234 0.240***
(0.210) (0.151) (0.224) (0.059)
II rating -13.781** 6.085 -23.490*** -17.416**
(6.326) (12.116) (4.051) (7.490)
ER volatility 0.083*** 0.106*** 0.074 -0.255***
(0.022) (0.033) (0.064) (0.055)
I(Fixed ER) -0.197 -0.627*** -2.975*** 1.264***
(0.334) (0.184) (0.353) (0.303)
Pseudo-R2: 0.393; Num. obs.: 6870; Log Likelihood: -6076.8
Base category is other currency.
36Table A.7: Multinomial logit regression for nancial rms. Financial centers.
USD Euro Yen Pound
I(after EMU) -0.026 -0.186 0.031 0.236
(0.323) (0.160) (0.108) (0.146)
Issue amount 4.099*** 3.757*** 1.246 3.537***
(0.593) (0.363) (1.379) (0.166)
I(bond rating 1.001 2.430 0.461 -0.081
is below IG) (0.866) (1.558) (0.747) (1.812)
Issue maturity 0.057 0.054 0.131 0.083
(0.055) (0.047) (0.089) (0.059)
Euro Area issue -17.651 6.028*** -19.814*** 5.248***
(0.000) (0.731) (1.138) (0.606)
U.S.gov. law 3.415*** 2.293* 0.706*** 4.631***
(1.013) (1.239) (0.216) (1.640)
U.K.gov. law 2.895** 2.645* 1.291*** 6.138***
(1.276) (1.492) (0.187) (1.894)
Germany gov. law 20.231*** -1.005 18.465 -0.871
(1.095) (1.198) . (2.808)
USD int. rate -0.069*** -0.044 -0.641*** -0.050**
(0.020) (0.081) (0.103) (0.022)
DM-USD int. rate 0.050 -0.080 0.290* 0.034
(0.054) (0.086) (0.169) (0.122)
JY-USD int. rate -0.229*** -0.224*** -0.917*** -0.198
(0.077) (0.060) (0.312) (0.138)
BP-USD int. rate 0.042 0.204* -0.062** 0.077
(0.243) (0.112) (0.024) (0.130)
CPI Ination 0.022 -0.140*** -0.093 -0.179
(0.056) (0.030) (0.111) (0.126)
II rating -3.359*** -4.536 -32.894*** -17.887***
(1.277) (5.920) (3.522) (2.061)
ER volatility 0.271*** 0.474*** 0.233*** 0.310***
(0.017) (0.024) (0.047) (0.016)
I(Fixed ER) 0.378*** 0.683*** -0.568** 0.315
(0.074) (0.245) (0.286) (0.228)
Pseudo-R2: 0.20; Num. obs.: 8812; Log Likelihood: -10302.7
Base category is other currency.
37Table A.8: Multinomial logit regression for non{nancial rms. EMU insiders.
USD Euro Yen Pound
I(after EMU) -0.549 1.365 0.836 1.145
(0.794) (0.963) (0.880) (1.370)
Issue amount 4.925*** 4.945*** 3.824*** 4.850***
(0.741) (0.775) (1.311) (0.659)
I(bond rating 1.030 1.696 -39.181*** 0.830
is below IG) (1.227) (1.242) (1.098) (1.418)
Issue maturity -0.015 0.040** -0.118** 0.042*
(0.015) (0.017) (0.047) (0.024)
Euro Area issue 2.578** 4.376*** 0.912 3.294**
(1.035) (0.590) (1.088) (1.296)
U.S.gov. law 5.331*** 2.928*** 1.006*** 4.158***
(0.719) (0.638) (0.387) (1.497)
U.K.gov. law 2.736*** 2.488*** 1.550*** 4.343***
(0.522) (0.252) (0.468) (1.201)
Germany gov. law 0.122 -0.864* 1.036 0.274
(0.537) (0.470) (0.976) (0.659)
USD int. rate -0.267 -0.173 -0.381* -0.373
(0.350) (0.314) (0.198) (0.425)
DM-USD int. rate -0.419** -0.578*** 0.055 -1.116***
(0.200) (0.125) (0.300) (0.256)
JY-USD int. rate -0.009 0.177 -0.974** 0.229
(0.325) (0.303) (0.457) (0.522)
BP-USD int. rate 0.000 0.252* 0.443 0.344
(0.118) (0.137) (0.439) (0.381)
Selection 1.848 0.237 -41.523*** -6.743
(6.010) (4.430) (12.848) (9.296)
CPI Ination 0.404 0.382** 0.372 0.572***
(0.310) (0.181) (0.337) (0.167)
II rating -8.117 -9.439 -29.504*** 4.831
(13.330) (12.450) (9.010) (14.082)
ER volatility 0.007 -0.018*** -0.026*** -0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010)
I(Fixed ER) 0.913 -0.066 0.279 1.495
(0.631) (0.817) (0.472) (1.026)
Pseudo-R2: 0.294; Num. obs.: 3765; Log Likelihood: -2308.1
Base category is other currency.
38Table A.9: Multinomial logit regression for nancial rms. EMU insiders.
USD Euro Yen Pound
I(after EMU) 0.314 0.294 -0.416 0.975**
(0.219) (0.269) (0.349) (0.432)
Issue amount 4.223*** 5.347*** -5.435*** 4.413***
(0.721) (0.623) (1.572) (0.646)
I(bond rating -2.078*** 29.585*** 1.400*** -1.564**
is below IG) (0.503) (0.842) (0.521) (0.674)
Issue maturity 0.078*** 0.082*** 0.207*** 0.098***
(0.019) (0.017) (0.030) (0.021)
Euro Area issue 2.102*** 2.609*** 0.657 2.560***
(0.583) (0.396) (0.666) (0.672)
U.S.gov. law 3.164*** -0.570 1.500*** 3.634***
(0.318) (0.531) (0.527) (0.805)
U.K.gov. law 2.149*** 1.597*** 2.318*** 2.362***
(0.353) (0.431) (0.487) (0.711)
Germany gov. law -0.334 -0.486 0.922 -0.826**
(0.352) (0.382) (0.641) (0.357)
USD int. rate -0.192 0.153** -0.537*** 0.118
(0.128) (0.068) (0.099) (0.176)
DM-USD int. rate -0.346*** -0.108* 0.428*** -0.097
(0.131) (0.061) (0.048) (0.131)
JY-USD int. rate 0.061 0.079 -0.913*** -0.088
(0.101) (0.079) (0.190) (0.160)
BP-USD int. rate 0.252* 0.128** -0.213 0.256***
(0.142) (0.055) (0.140) (0.065)
Selection -3.745 -5.774** -14.788** 4.063
(4.330) (2.692) (5.837) (5.112)
CPI Ination 0.320*** -0.030 0.040 0.103
(0.101) (0.088) (0.066) (0.120)
II rating -2.080 -4.208 -19.295*** 2.899
(6.578) (3.263) (5.033) (5.135)
ER volatility 0.004 0.003 -0.045*** -0.015***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002)
I(Fixed ER) 0.378** 1.003*** -0.112 -0.147
(0.168) (0.228) (0.300) (0.415)
Pseudo-R2: 0.217; Num. obs.: 16771; Log Likelihood: -17857.8
Base category is other currency.
39Table A.10: Multinomial logit regression for non{nancial rms. Small outsiders.
USD Euro Yen Pound
I(after EMU) -0.844 0.174 -0.502 -2.964**
(1.167) (0.975) (0.497) (1.303)
Issue amount 1.232*** 0.653 -18.879*** 0.885
(0.056) (0.422) (7.322) (0.551)
I(bond rating 23.502*** 23.383*** -7.059*** 23.092
is below IG) (0.346) (0.404) (1.605) .
Issue maturity 0.073*** 0.075*** 0.054* 0.052***
(0.010) (0.020) (0.031) (0.017)
Euro Area issue 2.138*** 24.396*** 3.333*** -16.966***
(0.597) (1.147) (0.681) (1.359)
U.S.gov. law 2.311*** 0.796** -1.283 -1.040***
(0.685) (0.362) (0.893) (0.325)
U.K.gov. law 1.969*** 1.926** 0.888 2.743*
(0.594) (0.898) (0.932) (1.666)
Germany gov. law -0.181 -19.683 -1.797 -16.451***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.087)
USD int. rate -0.642*** -1.030*** -1.110*** -1.221***
(0.126) (0.340) (0.313) (0.258)
DM-USD int. rate 0.089 0.644 0.604 0.542
(0.252) (0.452) (0.466) (0.380)
JY-USD int. rate -0.600*** -1.757*** -2.000*** -1.277***
(0.222) (0.588) (0.729) (0.400)
BP-USD int. rate 0.031 0.389 0.392** -0.063
(0.079) (0.246) (0.161) (0.792)
Selection 17.121 -15.379* -7.709** -41.384***
(14.654) (7.964) (3.629) (16.051)
CPI Ination -0.005 -0.076 0.241 -0.085
(0.072) (0.235) (0.150) (0.411)
II rating -8.401 2.730 -16.580*** 17.903*
(7.649) (2.001) (3.613) (9.799)
ER volatility 12.875** 3.259 8.493 -2.181
(6.197) (6.939) (6.700) (7.790)
I(Fixed ER) -1.681 0.991 1.297 1.905
(1.542) (1.372) (1.593) (1.268)
Pseudo-R2: 0.323; Num. obs.: 586; Log Likelihood: -521.4
Base category is other currency.
40Table A.11: Multinomial logit regression for nancial rms. Small outsiders.
USD Euro Yen Pound
I(after EMU) -0.470 -1.360** -0.124 -1.287***
(0.915) (0.602) (0.829) (0.423)
Issue amount -0.083 0.465 -9.964*** 0.381
(0.960) (1.135) (3.203) (1.086)
I(bond rating 0.369 2.715 -47.633*** 3.526***
is below IG) (0.960) (2.026) (1.321) (0.235)
Issue maturity 0.221*** 0.063** 0.418*** 0.022
(0.049) (0.026) (0.063) (0.043)
Euro Area issue -1.089** 2.789*** -4.106*** -63.923
(0.431) (0.993) (1.183) (0.000)
U.S.gov. law -0.907 -0.726*** -1.357 -1.309***
(0.808) (0.233) (1.694) (0.281)
U.K.gov. law -0.142 0.152 -1.445 0.399
(0.615) (0.358) (0.973) (0.854)
Germany gov. law -1.827*** -1.318 -40.728*** 18.542
(0.557) (0.978) (0.653) .
USD int. rate -0.115 0.084 -0.689** 0.039
(0.152) (0.066) (0.292) (0.245)
DM-USD int. rate -0.214*** -0.374*** -0.128 -0.463**
(0.032) (0.058) (0.112) (0.208)
JY-USD int. rate -0.335*** 0.075 -1.194*** 0.227
(0.087) (0.118) (0.282) (0.241)
BP-USD int. rate 0.396*** 0.291* 0.419*** 0.150
(0.031) (0.153) (0.144) (0.095)
Selection 16.753*** 14.228*** 22.726*** 15.598***
(1.873) (3.523) (4.610) (5.002)
CPI Ination -0.007 -0.186 0.055 -0.064
(0.226) (0.142) (0.143) (0.205)
II rating 5.095 15.682*** -13.744*** 13.338***
(4.383) (1.899) (4.263) (5.069)
ER volatility -0.658 1.281*** 1.698*** 1.590
(0.793) (0.133) (0.629) (1.914)
I(Fixed ER) -0.453*** -0.336 1.647*** -0.077
(0.166) (0.388) (0.470) (0.754)
Pseudo-R2: 0.374; Num. obs.: 4636; Log Likelihood: -3917.1
Base category is other currency.
41Table A.12: Multinomial logit regression for non{nancial rms. Denmark and Sweden.
USD Euro Yen Pound
I(after EMU) 2.580*** 1.070 -2.974*** -14.756***
(0.059) (0.997) (0.501) (3.367)
Issue amount 0.589 7.503*** -41.773*** 10.426***
(5.122) (1.057) (6.397) (0.602)
I(bond rating -3.740 41.627 1.016 2.044
is below IG) (0.000) . . .
Issue maturity -0.384*** 0.024 0.037*** 0.281***
(0.085) (0.040) (0.005) (0.017)
Euro Area issue -49.250 4.704*** -47.426 -21.341
(0.000) (1.103) (0.000) (0.000)
U.S.gov. law 28.906 22.228*** -17.036 -5.182
. (1.882) (0.000) (0.000)
U.K.gov. law 1.315*** 3.134* -0.309 18.054*
(0.412) (1.787) (0.560) (9.834)
Germany gov. law 35.771 36.331 42.019 48.250
. . . .
USD int. rate -0.583 1.408 0.121 0.525
(0.594) (1.398) (0.843) (0.791)
DM-USD int. rate 0.001 -0.223 1.092*** -0.821***
(0.383) (0.417) (0.420) (0.190)
JY-USD int. rate -0.267 0.829 -0.305 1.577**
(0.337) (1.198) (0.704) (0.761)
BP-USD int. rate 0.833 -0.181 -1.529*** -1.856*
(1.169) (0.629) (0.246) (1.051)
Selection 71.469*** -36.626 31.022 -362.053***
(1.154) (83.401) (50.826) (92.620)
CPI Ination -0.240 0.080 0.510*** -5.247***
(0.244) (0.429) (0.016) (0.682)
II rating -33.159*** 1.570 33.893*** 61.613**
(11.251) (11.272) (2.428) (29.072)
ER volatility -1.786*** 5.649*** -1.106 9.425***
(0.584) (1.768) (0.925) (3.407)
Pseudo-R2: 0.521; Num. obs.: 162; Log Likelihood: -106.7
Base category is other currency.
42Table A.13: Multinomial logit regression for nancial rms. Denmark and Sweden.
USD Euro Yen Pound
I(after EMU) 0.385 1.662 -1.112 -0.820
(1.790) (1.160) (1.669) (1.230)
Issue amount 6.877** 9.070** -19.772 8.529**
(2.927) (3.795) (14.009) (3.777)
Issue maturity 0.023 0.061 0.338*** -0.006
(0.045) (0.056) (0.108) (0.016)
Euro Area issue -37.875*** 1.008 -27.298*** -38.862***
(1.029) (0.699) (0.222) (1.785)
U.S.gov. law 40.618 -6.322 -3.729 -4.969
. (0.000) (2.782) (0.000)
U.K.gov. law 2.684*** 1.000** -0.024 1.131***
(1.003) (0.452) (0.648) (0.227)
Germany gov. law 22.586*** 25.592 48.642 24.903***
(1.354) . . (1.722)
USD int. rate -0.371* -0.423** -0.663 -3.156***
(0.211) (0.212) (0.512) (0.819)
DM-USD int. rate -0.132 0.197*** -0.079 1.154***
(0.471) (0.041) (0.305) (0.409)
JY-USD int. rate -0.415 -0.457** -0.843 -3.733***
(0.612) (0.217) (0.579) (0.722)
BP-USD int. rate 0.172 -0.200*** -0.204** -0.490
(0.334) (0.039) (0.081) (0.558)
Selection -1.607 19.302 -8.971*** 100.978***
(4.838) (20.850) (1.430) (5.314)
CPI Ination 0.171 0.283 0.363*** -0.408
(0.133) (0.274) (0.015) (0.540)
II rating -19.046 -18.198** -22.949** -26.706***
(16.027) (8.822) (9.873) (3.190)
ER volatility -0.769 -2.350*** -0.567 -3.985
(1.616) (0.656) (0.354) (2.845)
Pseudo-R2: 0.513; Num. obs.: 822; Log Likelihood: -544.6
Base category is other currency.
43Table A.14: Multinomial logit regression for non{nancial rms. First issues.
USD Euro Yen Pound
I(after EMU) 0.055 1.608** 1.311** 0.433
(0.485) (0.729) (0.621) (0.641)
Issue amount 0.901 0.644 -0.015 0.605
(0.687) (0.686) (1.040) (0.700)
I(bond rating 0.767 1.680 -43.210*** 2.068
is below IG) (1.292) (1.323) (1.518) (1.339)
Issue maturity 0.050* 0.054** 0.003 0.061**
(0.028) (0.026) (0.042) (0.027)
Euro Area issue 0.769 3.417*** -0.431 1.311
(1.439) (1.207) (1.656) (1.614)
U.S.gov. law 4.154*** 1.634** 0.475 1.532*
(0.590) (0.703) (0.891) (0.868)
U.K.gov. law 2.092** 2.253*** 1.677** 3.909***
(0.878) (0.858) (0.810) (0.888)
Germany gov. law 2.570* 1.917 1.558 3.429
(1.467) (1.719) (1.645) (2.197)
USD int. rate -0.310 -0.304 -0.220 -0.444*
(0.211) (0.191) (0.245) (0.262)
DM-USD int. rate -0.211 -0.380* -0.155 -0.330
(0.214) (0.214) (0.242) (0.357)
JY-USD int. rate 0.077 0.179 0.119 -0.070
(0.305) (0.352) (0.405) (0.534)
BP-USD int. rate -0.207 -0.118 -0.052 -0.110
(0.210) (0.212) (0.247) (0.252)
Selection 6.313 4.031 -3.268 -34.571
(8.990) (9.804) (9.063) (21.481)
CPI Ination -0.054 0.081 0.098 -0.031
(0.096) (0.101) (0.216) (0.206)
II rating -16.052*** -1.521 -28.926*** -19.982*
(5.403) (9.576) (5.461) (11.205)
ER volatility -0.000 -0.026*** 0.015 -0.034**
(0.010) (0.009) (0.042) (0.015)
I(Fixed ER) -1.095*** -0.408 -0.425 23.972***
(0.416) (0.441) (0.643) (1.211)
Pseudo-R2: 0.514; Num. obs.: 6710; Log Likelihood: -3995.8
Base category is other currency.
44Table A.15: Multinomial logit regression for non{nancial rms. Firms BA only.
Euro to Euro Any to Euro Euro to any
I(after EMU) 1.754*** 0.535 0.764***
(0.493) (0.338) (0.252)
Issue amount -0.031 0.103** 0.005
(0.063) (0.043) (0.075)
I(bond rating 0.568 0.646* -0.441
is below IG) (1.049) (0.338) (0.712)
Issue maturity -0.023 -0.037 -0.024*
(0.028) (0.024) (0.014)
Euro Area issue 4.365*** 4.386*** 0.671
(0.587) (0.949) (0.755)
U.S.gov. law 1.155 1.153 -0.604*
(0.895) (1.043) (0.325)
U.K.gov. law 0.973*** 1.740** -0.520*
(0.323) (0.846) (0.289)
Germany gov. law -1.755*** -1.292* -0.587
(0.570) (0.731) (0.672)
USD int. rate -0.015 0.159 0.172
(0.107) (0.104) (0.112)
DM-USD int. rate -0.406*** -0.165 -0.021
(0.150) (0.124) (0.121)
JY-USD int. rate 0.301 0.302** 0.169
(0.196) (0.133) (0.109)
BP-USD int. rate 0.271** 0.030 0.060
(0.134) (0.161) (0.123)
Selection -21.000** -17.950* -10.197
(10.414) (9.850) (9.945)
CPI Ination 0.143 0.103 0.031
(0.088) (0.095) (0.076)
II rating 0.418 3.884 1.356
(6.655) (5.824) (5.834)
ER volatility -0.037* -0.018 -0.022
(0.019) (0.016) (0.016)
I(Fixed ER) -1.284*** -0.078 0.448**
(0.442) (0.294) (0.203)
Pseudo-R2: 0.249; Num. obs.: 2528; Log Likelihood: -2213.7
Base category is non-euro to non-euro.
45